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Abstract
The paper discusses the meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth and
also reviews evidence of pro-poor growth (or the lack of it) in a large cross-section
of countries and time periods. The emerging story is that many episodes of growth
are not pro-poor and also that although economic reforms have had positive effects
in those countries that have been steadfast in implementing market reforms, the
overall impact on growth has been small for many countries and in most cases
not pro-poor. I present a general theory of pro-poor growth that includes ten principles that should be incorporated in all economic reforms that seek to generate
pro-poor growth. These principles highlight the importance of understanding the
poor, their economic activities, capabilities, constraints that impede their participation in markets and also an appreciation of linkages within sectors and regions.
It is argued that pro-poor reforms cannot have the intended impact unless there
are significant changes in the institutions of governance. Finally, the principles
presented underscore the fact that pro-poor growth policies cannot be sustained
without workable partnerships between markets and states in the ever changing
and complex processes of social and economic development.
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Economic Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth: Lessons for Africa and other
Developing Regions and Economies in Transition
I.

Introduction

The most pressing concern for policymakers in developing countries is designing and
implementing policies that raise the quality of life for the majority of their citizens within the
context of severe resource constraints. Quality of life, generally measured by various proximate
indicators such as life expectancy, health status, nutritional adequacy, infant and maternal
mortality, and various other measures of human capital, is highly correlated to a country’s
income, poverty and the quality of institutions. By and large, developing countries are
characterized by weak institutions, low growth and poverty all which translate into low levels of
human development. The multiplicative effects of these outcomes result in poverty traps that are
extremely difficult to break out of. This state of affairs has forced governments to embark on a
wide range of reforms in their institutions of governance and economies with the goal of
achieving economic growth.
Over the last four decades or so, there have been significant institutional and economic
reforms in developing countries. Institutional reforms have focused on the introduction of
political competition by shifting from military and single party regimes, strengthening the
institutions of governance through adoption of democratic constitutions and instituting
mechanisms for improved accountability and transparency. These reforms have been
instrumental in expanding the democratic space and to an extent have reduced conflict situations
that have in the past undermined development in a large number of countries.

Likewise,

virtually all developing countries have instituted wide ranging macroeconomic and sectoral
reforms—agriculture, trade, financial sector, monetary and fiscal policies, public sector reforms,
etc. These reforms have largely been in response to dismal economic performance, instability
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and associated outcomes such as poverty, high and unsustainable deficits, inflation rates, etc.
The primary object of economic reforms has therefore been the achievement of high and
sustained economic growth. Reforms translate into economic growth by establishing conducive
environment for saving and investment, risk taking, providing incentives to producers, creating
certainty in markets, increasing the size of markets by removing barriers to international trade,
improvements in competitiveness, removing barriers to entry, etc. By and large, economic
reforms are meant to lower the transactions of engaging in productive activities or the cost of
doing business. Public sector reforms support economic growth by increasing the efficiency of
government spending decisions and removing artificially created barriers that impede market
transactions.
The emphasis on reforming economies to achieve high rates of economic growth is largely
motivated by the fact that economic growth associates with lower poverty rates and
improvements in the quality of life generally. Reforms that result in high rates of economic
growth are therefore expected to result in substantial poverty reduction. If in fact there exist a
strong link between economic growth and poverty reduction, then economic reforms that
accelerate economic growth are the ideal anti-poverty strategies. It is because of the presumed
strong link between economic growth and poverty reduction that reforms have been widely
accepted across the developing world. However, while it is in fact true that economic growth
associates with poverty reduction, this outcome does not always hold or relationship can be
weak such that economic growth does not yield substantial declines in the levels of poverty.
Furthermore, different episodes of growth could have substantially different impact on poverty
even in the same country. Even more bothersome is that not all economic reforms result in
significant economic growth and there are cases where reforms have resulted in perverse
outcomes.
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Policymakers seeking to deal with the problem of poverty in developing countries therefore
have two key policy concerns. The first is to institute economic policy reforms that result in
economic growth. Second, they should be concerned that the ensuing growth associates with
substantial gains to the poor—what is referred to as pro-poor growth. This means that
policymakers must carefully evaluate economic reform proposals so that they prioritize reforms
that are pro-poor.
This paper looks at economic reform experiences of developing and transitional economies
with respect to growth outcomes and more specifically their impact on poverty. The paper relies
on existing literature and therefore largely reflects a compilation of state of knowledge on the
subject of growth and poverty. Nevertheless, I also attempt to present what I consider to be a
general theory of reforms and pro-poor growth. The section that follows provides a brief
summary of reform policies that have been implemented over the last four decades or so in
developing countries. Section III focuses on meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth.
Here we briefly outline a number of the common measures of poor growth followed by
evidence of growth and poverty reduction in a number of countries. It is demonstrated that,
while growth is generally good for the poor, there are many cases when growth experiences in
developing countries have not been pro-poor. Section IV provides a discussion of the link
between reforms and growth and also pro-poor growth. The general finding is that the impact
of reforms on growth has varied widely. While the reforming countries experience higher
growth, this growth has not been pro-poor. In addition, the African experience with reforms
has been disappointing. In Section V, I attempt to formulate what I call a general theory of reform
and pro-poor growth, or simply a pro-poor growth paradigm. The primary objective is to outline some
principles that can guide in the design of pro-poor growth policies. A brief summary of the
paper is provided in the concluding section.
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II.

Economic Reforms: From Structural Adjustment to Post-Washington Consensus

The general meaning of the term “reform” is to change direction or to take corrective measures.
In essence, reforms are prompted by unfavorable state of affairs such as slow growth, high rates
of poverty, debt crisis, inflation, macroeconomic instability, etc. The goal of reforms is therefore
to reverse such trends and move the economy to a more favorable growth path. The nature of
reforms varies a great deal across countries and also over time. In some cases, reforms involve
major changes in policy direction such as the shift away from planned economies to market
economies or from fixed exchange rates to flexible rates. In such cases, the reforms are initiated
in response to failure of existing policies to achieve say rapid growth or due to excessive
imbalances in the international trade markets. Other reforms may be less radical and often
involve gradual changes such as tax reductions or marginal changes in regulations. Regardless of
the nature of reform, they do nevertheless reflect a desire to change the trend as a result of
observed weaknesses in existing policies.
The key focus of economic reforms is the creation of wealth. The debate over wealth
creation has in turn been guided by some accepted orthodoxy, paradigm or conventional
economic thinking. Adam Smith’s prescription for free markets was in fact a critique of then
accepted orthodoxy that considered mercantilism as the best way for nations to accumulate
wealth. Likewise, recent economic reforms have been guided by some accepted wisdom or
orthodoxy about the processes that guide wealth creation. The accepted wisdom about the
creation of wealth change over time as new information is revealed following implementation of
specific policies. This section discusses some of the recent economic reforms in developing
countries.
The first broad economic reforms introduced in developing countries comprise policies that
are collectively referred to as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). The accepted
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development paradigm during the period after Second World War was one where central
planning was considered the best mechanism for resource allocation. The leading development
economistss of the day including Rostow, Myrdal and others all emphasized the importance of
the state in development and the inadequacy of a laissez faire market economy in resource
allocation. Thus, development theories of the day put a heavy emphasis on the importance of
government and the dangers associated with market failures as had been shown by Keynes.
However, over time, these government-led model of development failed in virtually all countries.
The interventionist polices resulted in a general lack of fiscal discipline and extensive
intervention in markets. Governments created inflationary situations as a result of public sector
deficits and monetary expansion. In addition, countries tended to regulate their exchange rates
resulting in overvalued currencies and also imposed various controls in both domestic and
international markets. Likewise, the countries were characterized by high levels of state provision
of goods and services. Thus the pre-SAP era was an era of “government” controlled economies
and maligned prices. As noted by Goff (2003), these policies resulted in serious instabilities:
Taken together, these policies severely restricted the scope of market forces:
limiting the role of the price mechanism and reducing incentives, efficiency and
innovation. They were also unsustainable: export industries were condemned to a
lack of competitiveness, leading to balance of payments deficits and the loss of
foreign exchange reserves. Fiscal deficits would add to the mountain of public
debt. The country would thus become dependent on repeated loans from the IMF
and the World Bank for fear of running out of funds and the resulting exchange
rate crisis and hyper inflation (p. 49).
In response, SAPs were recommended primarily to deal with stabilization and structural change.
Stabilization policies were meant to create more stable economies by lowering the inflationary
expectations and reducing the role of the government in determining prices. Stabilization
programs involved tighter monetary policies and higher real interest rates, reduction in
government spending such as subsidies and exchange rate depreciation so as to make imports
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relatively more expensive and exports cheaper. Policies to change the structure of the economies
were geared to making economies of developing countries closer to those of developed
countries and included trade liberalization through the removal of quantitative restrictions,
privatization of state enterprises and liberalization of the capital markets. Beginning in the 1970
and 1980s, many developing countries adopted “structural adjustment” reforms that were often
imposed as conditionalities for loans and other facilities by the Bretton Woods Institutions.
During the 1990s, the adjustment policies were followed by deeper and broader set of
reform policies that are now commonly referred to as the “Washington Consensus” so called
because they reflected the accepted orthodoxy by Washington-based development agencies,
namely, the Bretton Woods Institutions, US Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank.1 The
consensus included the following specific reforms—often referred to as the “ten
commandments” of economic development:
•

Fiscal discipline to reduce deficits, inflation and balance of payments

•

Reordering public expenditures priorities

•

Tax reform so as to have a broad tax base and moderate marginal tax rates

•

Liberalizing interest rates so that interests are determined by market forces

•

Competitive exchange rate

•

Trade liberalization—removal of quantitative restrictions and replacement with low and
uniform tariffs

•

Liberalization of foreign direct investment or generally openness to foreign investment

•

Privatization of state enterprises

•

Deregulation so as to reduce barriers to entry and exit

•

Property rights—legal security of rights

The Washington Consensus was largely influenced by the experiences of the East Asian economies.
While countries in Latin America and Africa stagnated, had high rates of inflations, large domestics

1

The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson in 1989.
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and international debt, etc, the Asian countries that had opened up their economies and followed
policies that were very similar to those of developed countries were prospering. In addition, several
empirical studies concluded that countries that pursued market policies grew significantly faster.
Thus, the East Asian development model was considered a major success and thus it was believed
that same policies would result in success if adopted by the other developing countries. During the
1990s, the Washington Consensus policies dominated reforms in Latin America and Africa.
The general thrust of the set of policies referred to as the Washington Consensus involved
adoption of conservative macroeconomic policies and liberal microeconomic policies.

These

policies translate in to expanding the role of the market in resource allocation and reducing the role
of the state to a minimum. The conventional wisdom that guided these policies was the belief was
that too much government involvement in the economies of many developing countries was a
primary hindrance to economic growth. The consensus recommended a relatively few instruments
with the primary goal being generating economic growth.
By the mid 1990s, the Washington Consensus as a development paradigm had started to lose
currency. There were concerns that the simple “free market” focus did not yield the positive results
expected and the Washington Consensus was soon replaced by what came to be known as the postWashington Consensus pioneered by Joseph Stiglitz (1998). Stiglitz was critical of the Washington
consensus largely because of its failure to take into account the importance of the state in the
development process and also the peculiarities of different countries.

In particular, Stiglitz

considered the Washington Consensus as having pushed the capabilities of the market too far:
To be sure, governments can make maters worse. No doubt, the Washington Consensus
represented, in part, a reaction to the failures of the state in attempting to correct those of
the market. But the pendulum swung too far in the other direction and for too long. The
consensus policies often assumed the worst about the nature and capability of governments
and made that one size fit all. That resulted in a strong bias against basing policy advice on
an analysis of what interventions are appropriate in what contexts or to build the
institutions or capacity of states to intervene effectively (Stiglitiz, Post-Washington
Consensus Consensus, p2.)
7

In the case of Africa, Stiglitz observes that the Washington Consensus policies were unsuitable and
largely resulted in failure:
In Africa, the costs of a simple-minded belief in the magic of the market were palpable
and huge. For example, policy conditionalities imposed on the countries of the region, too
often focused much too narrowly on liberalization of agricultural prices without
adequate attention to the pre-requisites to make that effective such as functioning
markets for inputs and outputs, credit availability and infrastructure (especially roads);
the insistence on static comparative advantage led to the fallacy of composition
whereby increasing exports of commodities by many countries led to collapse in their
prices; financial sector reforms were focused excessively on making interest rates
market-determined in very thin and rudimentary markets leading often to prolonged
periods of very high interest rates without improving the availability of credit. (Stiglitiz,
Post-Washington Consensus Consensus, p3-4).
Stigilitz emphasized the importance of quality institutions, voice and partnerships in governance of
states and also the links between national and international environment. In short, the post
Washington Consensus recognizes the important role of government in complementing markets.
While accepting the importance of markets, recent policy focus also recognizes the importance of
investing in the poor in areas such as health, education and good governance so that the people can
be able to take advantage of economic opportunities. The paradigm shift has associated with the
formulation and implementation of what is referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs). Policies under the PRSPs target economic growth but also prioritize pro-poor spending,
often requiring ring-fencing specific pro-poor expenditures. In addition, PRSPs are formulated
within the context of individual country’s circumstances and call for broad participation of the
people.
III.

Pro-Poor Growth: Meaning and Measurement
(i)

Meaning of Pro-Poor Growth

While growth is important, there has been concerns that growth may not necessarily reduce
poverty substantially and therefore just because a country experiences positive growth is not
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sufficient to assess whether the poor indeed benefit. Thus, in assessing the impact of growth on
poor, information on the distribution of gains from growth is necessary. That is, to determine
whether growth is pro-poor, it is necessary to evaluate how the benefits of growth are shared
amongst the different income groups. The increased focus on pro-poor growth is a consequence
of mounting evidence that for many episodes of growth, gains are not shared by all members
of the population and in fact growth may have associated with declining well-being of the
poor—what may be referred to as immiserizing growth. With the current focus on the
Millennium Development Goals, there is more emphasis on the concept of pro-poor growth
which is in essence placing higher weights on the well-being of the poor. In this section, we
focus on the link between reforms and economic growth, and more specifically, pro-poor
growth. We begin with a brief discussion of the meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth
followed by discussion of reforms and pro-poor growth.
Pro-poor growth is variously defined as follows:
•

In its simplest interpretation, the concept of “pro-poor growth” implies the type of
growth that is good for the poor. If we take this simple definition, then for so long as
growth associates with a reduction in the proportion of the poor in the population
(holding the poverty line constant), then it is pro-poor.

•

Pro-poor growth is also defined as growth that results in an increase in the incomes of
the poor. This means that real incomes of the poor between two time periods increases.
Ravalion and Chen (2003) consider growth to be pro-poor if, and only if the poor people
benefit in absolute terms.

•

Finally, others define pro-poor growth as one that associates with larger proportionate
increases in incomes of the poor than the rest of the population. In other words, this
definition takes into account the distributional shifts following economic growth. Klasen
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(2001) uses the term pro-poor growth to mean that the poor benefit disproportionately
from economic growth. This implies that the proportional income of the poorest quintile
or those below the poverty line should exceed the average income growth rate. A related
concept in discussing pro-poor growth is progressivity. The idea of progressivity is
commonly used in tax and benefit-incidence literature to mean that benefits are a
decreasing function of income (or tax burden increases with income). Gasparini (2005)
uses the concept of progressivity to capture pro-poor growth if the change in income as
a share of initial income (growth rate) is a decreasing function of income. Simply, propoor growth under this concept of progressivity is one where the change in income is a
decreasing function of the initial level of income. White and Anderson (2001) also
define pro-poor growth as one where the poor’s share of an income increase is greater
than their current share of total income or the poor’s share of an increase in income is
greater than some international benchmark. Simply, these definitions suggest that growth
is pro-poor if poor’s income grows more than the incomes of the non poor.
There are many other definitions of pro-poor growth (also referred by some authors as poverty bias
growth (Hersels (2000), Mcculloch and Bauch (1999)). The key element of these definitions is that
ensuing growth not only benefits the poor but they benefit disproportionately.
(ii) Measuring pro-poor growth
A number of measures of pro-poor growth have been developed. These measures seek to capture
the pro-poorness of growth as defined above. The various measures are either absolute (meaning
they focus exclusively on what happens to the poor) or relative which implies that the measures look
at the changes in the well-being of the poor relative to the other income groups. Some of the
common pro-poor growth measures and approaches are discussed below.
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(a) Growth Elasticity of Poverty
A simple measure of pro-poor growth is the total growth elasticity of poverty defined as the
proportional change in the poverty headcount between two time periods for a one percent change
in mean income.2 If the growth elasticity of poverty (GEP) is greater than 1, then it means that a
small change in income results in proportionally larger decreases in poverty. Other things equal, the
larger the GEP, the larger the reduction in poverty reduction for a given rate of growth—hence
more pro-poor. This measure is attractive because of its simplicity and the fact that it is not data
intensive. However, the measure can be misleading because the responsiveness of poverty to growth
also depends on the initial levels of income and state of income distribution. Poverty may be more
responsive to change in income when income is low as compared to higher incomes. Thus, the same
rate of economic growth may appear pro-poor in a low income country but not so in a middle
income country. Likewise, poverty is less responsive to increases in income if the inequality is
higher. Consequently, while GEP is a convenient measure, it should be interpreted with caution
particularly when comparing pro-poorness of growth across countries. In other words, although the
elasticities are illustrative, they are sensitive to the location of the poverty line in income distribution
(Bourguignon 2002, 2003; Ravalion 1997).3
(b) Rate of Pro-Poor Growth
The other measure of pro-poor growth takes into account not only the number of poor people but
also what happens to changes in incomes of the poor. Ravallion and Chen (2003) use Growth
Incidence Curves (GIC) to measure pro-poor growth. A GIC shows the rate of growth for a given
period of time at each percentile of the distribution. If GIC is >0, for particular percentiles, then it
2

The total Growth elasticity of poverty γ is given by [∆H/∆U*u/H], where H is the headcount index and u is the mean
income. The growth elasticity of poverty is obtained by estimating a regression equation of the following general form:
Log Pov= α + β LogU + γt + e where Pov is the poverty measured by headcount or consumption, U is the mean
income, γ is the trend rate of change in income and e is the error term.
3 Also, the elasticity measure can give quite misleading results. For example, if the rate of growth is zero and there is a
small change in poverty (reduction), the measure would imply an infinite growth elasticity of poverty.
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means that poverty declines for those groups. Ravallion and Chen propose a numerical indicator of
pro-poor growth based the mean of the growth rates of poor as a measure of pro-poor growth. If
the mean growth rate of the poor is positive, then growth is pro-poor and vice versa.
For illustration, Table 1 provides some hypothetical data showing three growth scenarios for
each of the percentiles. Each of the growth scenarios result in different growth incidence curves as
shown in Figures 1-3. For simplicity, we focus on the meaning of the different GICs. In Figure 1,
we observe that growth rate is >0 for all percentiles meaning that poverty has fallen for all groups.
However, the curve is also strictly increasing over all the income groups which suggest increases in
inequality. That is, the higher income groups benefit more. The horizontal line shows the mean
growth rate over entire distribution. As is evident, the lower income groups have growth rates that
are below the mean growth suggesting that growth is not pro-poor. Likewise, in Figure 2, the GIC
is above zero for entire distribution but the curve is strictly decreasing suggesting that the growth
associates with decreases in inequality. Furthermore, the growth rates for the poorest groups are
higher than the mean growth rate which means the poor benefit more than the rich-- hence propoor growth. Figure 3 shows a case where the middle group benefit most while the lowest and
richest groups benefit least.
Figures 4 and 5 show GICs for China based on Ravalion and Chen (2003). Both figures
show that growth in China has been high for entire distribution of population. The GIC for the
period 1990-1999 shows that growth in China was not pro-poor and resulted in increasing
inequality. On the other hand, for the period 1993-1996, the pattern of growth is different and propoor. This shows that in evaluating pro-poorness of growth, it is important to evaluate different
time intervals.
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(c) Pro-Poor Growth Index
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) develop a measure of pro-poor growth, which they call the Pro-Poor
Growth Index, that takes into account the effect of growth on income distribution and poverty.
The premise of this measure is that poverty reduction is dependent on both economic growth and
changes in income distribution. Specifically, increases in growth reduce poverty but if such increases
also associate with increases in inequality, then the magnitude of poverty reduction is lower. That is,
increases in inequality lowers the poverty reduction effectiveness of growth.

Thus a measure of

pro-poor growth that does not take into account the effect of changes in inequality on poverty
reduction will tend to be biased (over estimate the poverty reduction if inequality had increased).
Kakwani and Pernia decompose the proportionate change in poverty (O) resulting from 1%
change in growth into two components:
(a) impact of growth when income distribution does not change (pure growth effects- Og)
(b) the impact of income distribution when the total income remains constant (pure inequality
effect-O1)
Such that:

O = Og + O1

The pure growth effect is negative because growth reduces poverty if inequality is held constant.
The pure inequality effect can be negative (if inequality decreases) and positive (if inequality
increases). They define the Pro-Poor Growth Index (PPGI= Ø ) as ratio of the total poverty
elasticity of growth (γ ) to the elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income assuming no
change in income distribution ( γg)
Ø = γ/γg
Ø is the pro-poor growth index. If Ф>1, then the growth is pro-poor if

0<Ф<1, although

economic growth reduces poverty, the inequality effect of economic growth is negative and
therefore the poor benefit proportionately less than the non-poor.
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Table 2 which is borrowed from Kakwani and Pernia shows the computation of PPGI for
the case of the Lao people’s Republic. For the periods 1992-1993 and 1997-1998, Lao experienced
impressive growth but this growth episodes were also accompanied with rapid increases in
inequality. This means that although growth would as expected result in reductions in poverty, the
pro-poorness of the growth is reduced by increases in inequality. The overall poverty elasticity was 0.7 which can be decomposed into pure growth effect (-3.2) and pure inequality effect (2.6). The
pro-poor growth index is therefore (-0.7/-3.2) = 0.21. This means that growth was associated with
reduction in poverty but was not pro-poor.
(d) Poverty-Equivalent Growth Rate
Kakwani and Son (2002) extend the PPGI to what they refer to as the Poverty Equivalent Growth
Rate (PEGR). Although the PPGI captures the distribution of benefits to the poor and non-poor, it
does not account for the rates of actual growth rate. We have observed that increases in income
reduces poverty but increases in inequality increase poverty. Thus, growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if
the change in inequality that accompanies growth reduces (increases) total poverty. This means that
growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if the total elasticity of poverty is greater (less) than the growth
elasticity of poverty (Kakwani and Son 2002). The PEGR (γ*) is the growth rate that will result in
the same level of poverty reduction as the present growth rate γ if the growth process has not been
accompanied by change in inequality. The PEGR is obtained by simply multiplying the PPGI by the
growth rate of mean income:
PEGR= γ* = PPGI* γ
Where γ is the growth rate of mean income. A characteristic of this measure is that proportional
reduction in poverty is a monotonically increasing function of the PEGR. Growth is pro-poor (antipoor) if γ* is greater (less) than γ. If γ* is between 0 and γ, then growth is accompanied with
increased inequality but poverty reduces. If γ* is negative, then such growth is immiserizing and the
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benefits of growth are offset by increases in inequality. Kakwani and Son suggest that a country’s
performance in reducing poverty should be judged on the basis of PEGR and not just by growth
rate alone.
Table 3 and Figure 6 provides some hypothetical data to illustrate the concept of PEGR.
The data shows the actual growth rate and the corresponding poverty equivalent growth rate. Again,
the PEGR is here assumed to represent the growth rate that would result in the same level of
poverty reduction if growth does not result in changes in inequality. In year 1, the actual growth rate
is 10% but the PEGR is 6%. This means that the 10% actual growth with the associated inequality
increases would result in the same level of poverty reduction as 6% growth with no changes in
inequality. If actual growth rate is higher than the PEGR (cases 1-3, 9-10), and both are positive,
then poverty reduces but the growth is not pro-poor. If on the other hand PEGR is greater than
actual growth and both are positive, then the growth is pro-poor. For the periods 6-8, the economy
experiences a recession and the PEGR is lower than the actual growth rates and both are negative
meaning that the recession hit the poor harder.
(e) Poverty Growth Curve
Son (2003) has proposed another measure of pro-poor growth which he refers to as the Poverty
Growth Curve (PGC) that is based on the definition of pro-poor growth as growth where the poor
benefit proportionately more than the rich. The PGC is analogous to the GIC but has some distinct
properties and uses a higher standard for pro-poor growth. If we describe the Lorenz curve as L(p)
as the percentage share of income or expenditure enjoyed by the bottom p percent of the
population, then the generalized Lorenz Curve is given by µL(p) where µ is the mean income or
expenditure. If the entire Lorenz Curve shifts upward, then the new distribution is said to exhibit
second order dominance over the previous distribution. In this case, if the ∆µL(p) >0 for all p,
(meaning that the generalized Lorenz Curve shifts upward) then poverty decreases unambiguously
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for various measures of poverty (Ω) and for all poverty lines.

Likewise, if the curve shifts

downward, poverty increases unambiguously (Atkinson 1987). Son defines the PGC as the growth
rate of the mean income g(p) of the bottom p percent of the population when the individuals are
ranked by their per capita income or expenditures.

Thus, if g(p) >0 poverty decreases

unambiguously and vice versa. If g is the growth rate for the entire population, the growth is propoor if g(p)>g for all p<100. If 0<g(p)<g for all p<100, then growth reduces poverty but is
associated with increases in inequality so that the poor benefit less than the non-poor. On the other
hand, if g(p) <0 for all p<100 and g is positive, then this implies immiserizing growth.
Table 4 provides some illustrative data and shows growth rate for all percentiles and the
growth rate of mean income (which is given by growth when p=100). Case 1 shows that growth is
positive for all percentiles meaning that poverty decreases unambiguously. However, the growth rate
for all p<100 is less than the mean growth rate, hence the poor benefit less than the rich and thus
growth is not pro-poor. Case II shows that growth rate for all p<100 is higher than the mean
growth rate and as such growth reduces poverty and is also pro-poor. Cases III shows a case where
the economy experiences a recession but the poor are hit more than the rich. Figure 7 shows the
Poverty Growth Curve.
Summary-Pro-Poor Growth Meaning and Measurement
During the last few years, there has been an explosion in the volume of literature on pro-poor
growth. The interest is, as noted previously, driven primarily by concerns that the poor do not
always benefit from growth. The definitions of pro-poor growth therefore generally seek to capture
the gains by the poor relative to non-poor. As shown, there has been major advances in techniques
to measure pro-poor growth primarily attributed to Ravalion, Chen, Kakwani and Son. All these
measures focus primarily on capturing the gains to the poor and also on changes in the income
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distribution arising from growth. The meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth are of policy
relevance and emphasizes the importance of looking beyond the aggregates.
IV.

Reforms, Growth and Poverty Reduction

Before proceeding with an analysis of reforms and growth, we begin by reviewing country
experiences with economic growth and poverty reduction.

Because the primary objective of

economic reforms is to achieve economic growth, we first look at the role of growth on poverty
reduction. Relying on existing studies, we draw some broad conclusions about growth and poverty
reduction. We then investigate whether in fact growth is generally pro-poor.
(i)

Growth and Poverty Reduction

There is now a large volume of empirical studies on the relationship between growth and poverty
reduction.

These studies typically evaluate elasticity of poverty with respect to changes in

consumption or income between two time periods (intervals). The expected relationship is that
growth reduces poverty, hence a negative coefficient. As noted previously, the size of the elasticity
of poverty matters in terms of evaluating effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty.

For our

purposes, we focus on whether growth reduces poverty.
Table 5 provides empirical findings of the poverty elasticity of growth for different countries
and time periods. By and large, the results show that growth associates with poverty reduction.
However, the elasticities vary widely across countries and with episodes of growth. Low elasticities
suggest that growth does not reduce poverty substantially. The results presented here basically
support the well-established fact that growth is good for the poor. Hence, growth is necessary for
poverty reduction. Nevertheless, this does not mean that growth is necessarily pro-poor as defined
in this paper. As previously observed, capturing the pro-poorness of growth requires that we look
more carefully at what happens to the incomes of the poor and also the state of income distribution.
(ii)

Pro-Poor Growth
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Tables 6,a-d provide summaries of empirical evidence of the pro-poorness of growth for
various countries using different measures discussed previously.

Table 6a shows results from

Kakwani and Pernia (2000) for a number of Asian countries; Table 6b summarizes results the
experiences of 18 Africa countries based on a study by Bingsten and Shimeles (2003); Table 6c
provides results of a study by Son (2003) that include 84 countries and 241 growth episodes; and
Table 6d reports the results of a sample of Latin American countries by Gasparani (2005). Table 7
which is obtained from Cord et al (2003) provides additional cross country evidence of pro-poor
growth. The results presented in these studies reveal that many episodes of economic growth are not
pro-poor. This is true for all measures of pro-poor growth and for all measures of poverty. In fact,
the evidence reveals that while episodes of economic growth generally associate with reduction in
the incidence of poverty, they are not pro-poor.
(iii)

Reforms and pro-poor growth

We now turn to the impact of reforms in producing pro-poor growth. In evaluating the impact of
reforms, four key issues are of interest:
•

In General, are reforms successfully in generating economic growth?

•

Which type of reforms appear to associate most strongly with economic growth?

•

In cases for which reforms have translated into growth, has that growth been pro-poor?

•

What types of reforms appear to be both good for economic growth and also pro-poor?

Table 8 provides a schema for evaluating reforms. In as far as growth is concerned, there are
three possible outcomes: (i) No change in growth, (ii) negative growth and (iii) positive growth.
Each of these outcomes could also be associated with no change, increase or decrease in poverty
and inequality. The direction and magnitude of change of both poverty and inequality determines
pro-poorness of growth. We can therefore evaluate reforms by classifying their impact on growth,
poverty and inequality. But evaluating reforms is complicated and requires detailed analysis of
specific country experiences. For one, although it is true that many developing countries have
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implemented reforms, it is important to note that commitment to the reforms has varied greatly and
there has been many cases stop-and-go and outright policy reversals. Thus, it is difficult to isolate
the failure of policies per se from the inadequacies of the policies and the implementation issues
themselves. In addition, the institutional context may influence the success of reforms. Finally,
policies may yield pro-poor growth in one country and completely opposite results in another The
point here is that good analysis of reform and pro-poor growth should be on case by case basis.
Reforms and Growth
The above concerns not withstanding, for reforms to be pro-poor, they must first result in
accelerated growth and so the question is whether reforms in developing countries have associated
with growth. Thus, before we even worry whether growth is pro-poor or not, we need to evaluate
whether economic reforms have had positive growth trajectory.
The predominant thrust of reforms in developing countries since the 1980s as embodied in
the structural adjustment policies and the broad Washington Consensus has been to improve the
functioning of markets or simply shifting economies to a market orientation. These policies have
included macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of domestic and international trade—including
exchange rate and price liberalization, removal of price distorting policies such as agricultural price
support, financial sector reforms, privatization and overall reduction of the size and scope of
government. If we consider the period since 1980s as the reform period, we can then evaluate the
growth experiences in the reforming countries.
Tables 9 and10 provides data for growth rates for Latin America and Sub-Saharan African
countries respectively. Table 9 also provides aggregate growth rates for other countries. The
aggregate data reveal that the growth experience of Latin America and Africa has been disappointing
during the reform period. The regions actually experienced higher growth rates during the prereform era. Latin American countries showed some signs of growth during the early 1990s but SSA
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stagnated. In fact, data reveals that about 16 countries had lower per capital income in 1994 than in
1960 (Rodrick 1997).

However, East Asia managed to maintain high growth throughout. If we

were then to judge reforms based on the aggregate data, then a broad conclusion is that reforms
have not been good for growth. However, this is misleading. If we look closely to the growth
experiences of individual countries in Tables 9 and 10, we find that growth varies widely across the
countries. The emerging picture is that there have been wide variations in the growth performance
with some countries experiencing credible growth while others had disastrous experiences. Data for
the mid 1990s and early 2000s shows that SSA economies have performed better than previous
periods achieving a growth rate of 2% in per capita GDP between 1995 and 1999 (IMF 2005).
Again, there are wide variations across countries. Thus, it would be misleading to attribute poor
growth performance to reforms. Still, SSA performance is much lower than other developing
countries. Appendix 1 shows recent growth performance in Africa.
Empirical evidence on the determinants of growth show that controlling for other variables,
market reforms have had a positive effect on growth (Greenaway and Wright (2001); Barro (1991,
1996); Fernandez and Montiel (1997), Gregorio and Lee; Rodrik (1997); Dollar (1992); Bruno and
Easterly (1995); Sachs and Warner (1995); Levine and Zervos (1993), Kimenyi, et al (2003), among
others). These studies evaluate the independent effects of policies such as trade liberalization,
inflation, commercial policies, etc. Thus, the empirical evidence suggest that other things equal,
market reforms are good for growth. Countries that have been persistent in solidifying reforms and
thus score high on measures of quality of policy indices, have other things constant, experienced
higher growth rates. While countries may experience some initial slow down with the
commencement of reforms, sustaining and deepening reforms seem to pay off in the long run. Thus
a general conclusion is that market reforms are good for growth. For Africa, it appears from
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evidence that the failure to grow is primarily due to both institutional factors (wars for example) and
failure to sustain reforms.
Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth
We now turn to investigating whether the growth resulting from reforms is pro-poor. We have
already observed that for many countries, the growth performance has been weak. Thus, regardless
of whether such growth is pro-poor or not, we would not expect much by way of poverty reduction
given the values of the growth elasticity of poverty presented earlier. Evidence reveals that for most
of the developing countries—especially in SSA, poverty rates generally increased during the reform
period. In other words, there has not been substantial poverty reduction associated with reforms.
Early evaluation of the structural adjustment programs for example showed that, even where the
policies resulted in growth, poverty increased. Table 11 shows the changes in poverty for some of
the adjusting African countries. The results show that countries like Ghana, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe that scored favorably in terms of macroeconomic policies also experienced increases in
poverty (see also Ali ).
Szekely (2003) finds that while reforms have had a positive effect on growth in Latin
America, the growth has also associated with increases in inequality so that the gains to the poor
have been modest. Thus, growth in Latin America has not been pro-poor. This is consistent to
results by Gasparini (2005). If we look at the evidence of pro-poor growth provided in this paper
(see data discussed in Section III), we find that the growth experiences for most of the reforming
countries has not been pro-poor. In some cases, reforming countries have actually experienced
immiserizing growth.
Summary: Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth
An evaluation of reform and growth experiences is complex and linking reforms to pro-poor growth
is even more so. The foregoing discussion provides some highlights on the country experiences
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with reforms, growth and poverty reduction. The broad conclusions that we draw from existing
evidence can be summarized as follows:
•

Growth is good for poverty reduction

•

Controlling for other variables including institutional features, market reforms are good for
growth

•

Market reforms supplemented or complemented by state interventions are good for both
growth and equity and are pro-poor

•

Country growth experiences vary considerably

•

Most growth episodes associate with poverty reduction but are not pro-poor

•

Casual evidence seems to show that where reforms have resulted in growth, the growth has
not been pro-poor for most countries

•

V.

For Africa, there are two key problems that we should be concerned with:
-

low growth (or even negative growth); and

-

limited pro-poor growth.

A Pro-Poor Growth Paradigm

The ultimate object of poverty reduction is to enhance human development which essentially
implies improvements in people’s well-being.

Following Sen (1987), I consider well-being to

incorporate two key aspects—functionings and capabilities. Functionings refer to the type of life
people are able to achieve while capabilities refers to the capacity and freedom to achieve and
choose life or functionings. From Sen’s insights, we can consider pro-poor growth to be growth
that expands the opportunities and capabilities of the poor so that they participate more and benefit
from economic activities.

Thus pro-poor growth policies must necessarily stimulate economic

activities that the poor are involved in and at the same time must raise their capabilities so that they
can exploit opportunities. This is not to say that the broad policies such as macroeconomic stability
are not important. To the contrary, reform policies for growth of the entire economy are necessary
for poverty reduction. However, we have seen that these policies might not reach the poor and thus
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we need specific polices for pro-poor growth. Below, I focus on basic principles that I consider
essential for the achievement of pro-poor growth which I call the Ten Commandments of Pro-Poor
Growth. Taken together, these principles encompass what I consider to be general theory of propoor growth policies.
A. The Poor and Their Activities.
One simple but crucial concept in policy design is the principle of target efficiency. Policies are most
effective when they are appropriately targeted. Within the context of pro-poor growth, it is apparent
that a possible reason for the failure of the broad reform policies is that they do not target the poor
effectively. One reason for this is the assumption that effects of policies are effectively transmitted
to the poor through the market mechanism—which is the basis of many of the market policies. But
this process assumes that market signals are transmitted to all sectors and with sufficient speed and
efficiency so that all markets respond to policy shocks. In addition, such models implicitly assume
that markets are well integrated and adjust appropriately. If this were the case, broad policies can be
expected to influence the activities of the poor. Because the idea of pro-poor growth is that the
poor benefit most from growth, then a pro-poor policy must by design invigorate what the poor do
much more than the other activities.
Consider an economy characterized by sectoral distribution of activities as shown in Table
12. Assume that a policy shock is introduced in this economy—say liberalization of prices. Except
for subsistence fishing, the various sectors respond positively but to varying degrees as reflected by
the assumed adjustment coefficient (meaning percentage change in economic activity in response to
the policy shock). Even if we assumed that poverty was evenly distributed across the sectors, the
ensuing growth would not be pro-poor as most of the population benefit far less than others. This
policy, though increasing economic activity also increases the inequality. The most likely reason for
the differential outcomes is that some sectors are not strongly integrated. For example the rural
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subsistence agriculture and urban informal sectors may be only weakly linked to the formal sectors
of the economy. Because of the fact that markets are not fully integrated, the impact of reform
policies may not influence some of the markets. Simply, the basic issue here is that we need to know
and target where the poor people are and what the do (see Mwabu and Thorbecke 2001). I therefore
propose the following principle for pro-poor reform policies:
•

Principle 1: Pro-poor reform policies must target activities of which most poor are involved in directly
rather than relying on leakages from other markets.

B. Improving the Functioning of Markets for the Poor
Past reforms have tended to focus on broad policies that improve the functioning of markets
generally. Trade liberalization and deregulation of the domestic economy all improve on the
efficiency of markets. But such reforms may have limited impact on the functioning of markets for
the poor. Just because we liberalize trade does not necessarily imply that the rural agriculture
markets operate more efficiently. Consequently, pro-poor reforms must focus on those constraints
that hinder the poor from fully participating in markets. A poor farmer’s main barriers may not even
be production but taking goods to the markets. Markets for the poor can be significantly enhanced
for example by simple improvements in rural access roads that make it possible for the farmers to
engage in bigger rural markets.
•

Principle 2: Pro-poor reform policies must focus on improving the functioning of markets where poor people
participate.

C. Exploiting What the Poor have in Abundance—Labor
A good measure of a pro-poor growth reform must be one that results in increased utilization of
what marketable resource the poor have in abundance—unskilled labor. Many reforms that have
resulted in economic growth have mainly impacted on sectors that require skilled labor. In essence
the reforms result in increasing wages of high income earners but neither increases employment or
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wages of low skill workers. The result is that those reforms increase inequality and have no
significant increases in the incomes of the poor. Pro-poor reforms must therefore target stimulation
of those labor-absorbing activities which calls for policies that raise production in agriculture and
labor intensive industries. Hence the next principle:
•

Principle 3: Pro-poor reform policies should support low-skill, labor intensive economic activities.

D. Improving Linkages Between Markets
The fact that reform policies may have generated growth but have had limited impact on poverty
reduction suggests that markets are weakly linked as suggested above. One could think of multiple
markets in the same country and which are poorly linked or at least that there are bottlenecks that
hinder spillover effects from one sector to another. Because of the poor linkage, some markets
might experience booms but this does not filter to other markets. Because most macro policies
operate more directly in formal markets where the well-off participate, growth cannot be pro-poor
unless the impact of those markets is transmitted to those markets. Likewise, the poor may increase
production but they may not benefit substantially because they may not be able to reach those other
markets (for example, a farmer who grows vegetables but is not able to access the wider urban
markets). By and large, I consider a key problem of the failure of growth to filter down to the poor
as due to segmentation of markets. Thus, a way to increase the pro-poorness of growth must seek to
reduce the degree of market segmentation:
•

Principle 4: Pro-poor reform policies should seek to reduce market segmentation so that markets for the
poor are better integrated in the economy which requires improving on the forward and backward linkages.

E. Capabilities
Poverty is directly related to productivity—that is, poor generally have low productivity primarily
because of lack of appropriate skills. Thus, even when the economy expands, increases in the
earnings of the poor tend to lag those of skilled workers considerably. As already noted, a pro-poor
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growth strategy must translate in large improvements in the earnings of the poor relative to the nonpoor. Because of the fact that the poor start with very low or no skills at all, small investments that
raise their capabilities can have larger increases in productivity. It is such response to productivity
that would translate into pro-poor growth. Reform policies should therefore include a mixture of
targeted public expenditure that raises capabilities such as in health, education, skills training, etc.
Improving the capabilities of the poor raises productivity and gives the poor tools that helps them
exploit economic opportunities.
•

Principle 5: Pro-poor growth strategy should ring-fence public expenditures for raising capabilities of the
poor.

F. Target Groups Outside the Market
Within many of the developing countries, there are many groups that operate outside the market—
that is, they are completely cut off from markets. The general reforms that were discussed earlier
would have absolutely no impact on these groups (adjustment coefficient = 0). The implication here
is that there are groups that operate completely outside the market and will not benefit from most of
the broad macro reforms. As such, a pro-poor growth strategy must seek to bring these groups into
the realm of markets which may require facilitation to create markets. These groups of poor can only
benefit if there are specific policies that result in the evolution of markets.
•

Principle 6: Pro-poor growth policies should create mechanisms for enabling those groups that operate
outside the markets to participate in all forms of markets (commodity, credit, labor, and land markets)

G. Food Security
One simple rule for pro-poor growth should be to focus on ensuring that the poor are insulated
from hunger. No policy will help the poor out of their state if in fact they are exposed to
possibilities of starvation. Thus, there has to be a well focused policy that ensures that food is
available to the poor—meaning improvements in production, distribution, storage, etc.
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•

Principle 7: Pro-poor reforms should include a food security policy.

H. Strategies to Deal with vulnerability
One of the reasons that gains by poor tend to be eroded is because of their exposure to extreme
risks—drought, floods, disease, etc. All these random events (and some not so random) hit the
poor hard resulting in large swings in welfare often eroding any gains achieved from growth during
normal times. These may involve early warning systems and appropriate safety nets.
•

Principle 8: A broad pro-poor growth reform strategy should include policy initiatives that protect
vulnerable populations from large swings in consumption.

I. Assets
A key element of sustainable pro-poor growth has to do with asset accumulation (Kimenyi 1994;
Kimenyi et al. 1998). Pro-poor growth will be self sustaining if it results in accumulation of assets by
the poor. A most important asset for many developing countries is land but there are also many
other forms of assets that the poor could accumulate. More often than not, there are many barriers
to accumulation of assets—from system of rights to pure imperfection in the markets. Policy
should therefore focus on removing barriers that make it difficult to accumulate assets.
•

Principle 9: Pro-Poor Growth reforms should include policies that support accumulation of tradable assets
by the poor.

J. Governance
Finally, reforms for pro-poor growth must be founded on good governance. In particular, the
reforms must focus on those policies that make it possible for the poor to fully participate in the
decision making process and be able to hold those in power accountable. This requires broad
institutional reforms that increase the poors’ voice—basically power diffusion (Kimenyi 2005a and
2005b).
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•

Principle 10: Pro-poor growth reforms must include institutional reforms that empower the poor through
progressive diffusion of power.

VI.

Conclusion: Reform Experiences and Lessons

This paper has covered broad issues concerning pro-poor growth and economic reform. I have
discussed the main economic reforms that developing countries have implemented since the 1970s
and shown that, by and large, these reforms have focused on market reforms. I have also discussed
the meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth and also provided evidence of pro-poor growth
or the lack of it in large cross-section of countries and time periods. The emerging story is that
many episodes of growth are not pro-poor and also that although economic reforms seem to have a
positive effect on growth in those countries that have been steadfast in their reforms, the overall
impact on growth has been small for most countries. Furthermore, the evidence seems to show that
where reforms have translated in positive growth, the growth has not been pro-poor.
Finally, I have provided 10 basic principles for pro-poor growth. These principles rely on
casual observations and development literature —looking at what poor people do, where they live,
what they can offer to the market, how they can increase their productivity, etc. These principles
highlight the importance of looking at the poor as people rather than as mere numbers and getting a
better understanding of the economy and the linkages within sectors and regions. Pro-poor reforms
cannot have their intended impact unless there are significant changes in the institutions of
governance. Finally, pro-poor policies cannot be sustained without workable partnerships between
markets and states in the ever changing and complex processes of social and economic
development.
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Table 1: Growth and Poverty: Hypothetical Data
Percentile
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Mean growth

Growth1
1.6
2.2
2.5
3.0
3.7
4.8
6.5
7.5
7.8
8.0
4.

Growth2
7.8
7.5
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.2
2.8
2.2
2.0
4.

Growth3
1.2
1.8
2.4
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.0
3.8
2.0
1.0
3.

Table 2: Growth and Inequality Effects on Poverty Reduction, Lao, PDR
Poverty Incidence
1992- 1993
1993-1997
% Annual Change
Poverty Elasticity
Explained by
Growth
inequality
Pro-poor Growth Index

Headcount
Ratio
45.0
38.4
-3.1
-0.7

Poverty Gap
Ratio
11.3
10.3
-1.8
-0.4

Severity of
Poverty
4.2
4.0
-0.9
-0.2

-3.2
2.6
0.21

-4.2
3.8
0.09

-2.9
2.7
0.07

Source: Kakwani and Pernia (2000)
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Figure 1: Growth Incidence Curve-Case 1
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Figure 2: Growth Incidence Curve-Case 2
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Figure 3: Growth Incidence Curve-Case 3
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Figure 4: Growth Incidence Curve for China, 1990-1999
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Figure 5: Growth Incidence Curve for China, 1993-1996
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Table 3: Poverty Equivalent Growth

Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Actual growth
10.00
9.00
7.00
4.00
4.00
-1.00
-0.50
-0.50
4.00
6.00

PEGR
6.00
6.00
5.00
5.00
6.00
-0.50
-0.10
-0.80
2.00
3.00

Table 4: Poverty Growth Curve
Percentile

Case I

Case II

Case II

10
20

7.50
7.00

6.00
5.60

-3.45
-3.12

30

6.80

5.40

-3.00

40

6.40

5.20

-2.85

50

6.20

5.19

-2.50

60

6.00

5.00

-2.20

70

4.85

4.20

-2.00

80

4.60

4.00

-1.80

90

4.00

3.60

-1.50

100

8.00

2.50

-1.00
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Figure 6: Equivalent Growth Rate
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Table 7: Poverty Growth Curve
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Table 5: Growth Elasticity of Poverty
STUDY

Countries

Adams 2003
Ravalion and Chen 2003
Bruno, Ravalion and Squire
Kakwani and Pernia (2000)

50 countries
42 countries
20 countries
Korea
Lao
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam

Pasha and Palanivel (2004)

Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam

Periods/Intervals Growth
Elasticity
Of Poverty
101
- 2.59
64
- 3.12
-2.12
1994-95
-3.10
1992/93-97/98
-0.70
1994-97
-2.50
1994-96
-3.10
1992/93-97/98
-1.10
1980s
1990s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1980s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1990s

-0.29
-0.81
-2.31
-0.18
-1.26
-1.09
-2.15
-0.60
-0.77
-1.33
-1.35
0.72
-1.37
-1.26
-1.36
0.63
0.33
0.27
-2.73
-0.38
2.01
-0.30
-2.28
1.24
-1.02
0.10
-0.63
-1.18
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Table 5 Cont.: Growth Elasticity of Poverty
STUDY

Countries

Christiaensen, Demery and Ethiopia
Paternostro
Ghana
Madagascar
Mauritania
Nigeria
Uganda
Zambia
Gasparini (2005)

Argentina

Chile

Paraguay

Uruguay

Periods/Intervals Growth
Elasticity
Of Poverty
1994-1997
- 0.56
1992-1999
1993-1997
1997-1999
1993-1999
1987-1995
1992-1996
1992-1997
1991-1996
1996-1998
1992-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
1992-2003
1990-1994
1994-1998
1998-2000
1990-2000
1997-1999
1999-2001
2001-2002
1997-2002
1989-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
1989-2003

-0.95
-0.27
-4.50
-0.11
-0.82
-1.30
-1.21
-0.58
0.37
73.7
-6.4
-0.3
-3.6
-1.4
-1.4
-4.4
-1.3
-0.4
-3.3
-4.1
-0.6
11.4
4.7
-3.8
-5.2
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Table 6a: Pro-Poor Growth
Study
Country/Region Measure
Interval
Kakwani
Korea
Pro-poor
1994-1995
and Pernia
growth index
(2000)
(PPGI)
Lao
PPGI
92/93-97/98
Philippines
PPGI
1994-1997
Thailand
PPGI
1994-1996
Vietnam
PPGI
1992/9397/98

Value
1.14

Pro-poor
yes

0.21
0.67
0.64
0.84

no
no
no
no

Table 6b: Pro-Poor Growth in Africa
Study

Country/Region

Bingsten and 18
African
Shemels
Countries
Bingsten and Lao
Shemels

Measure

Interval

White
and 67 spells
Anderson
Kakwani and 67 spells
Pernia

%Propoor
55%
40%

Table 6c: Pro-Poor Growth- International (Source- Son (2003))

Growth Type
Pro-poor
Not pro-poor
Immiserizing
Inconclusive
Total

Positive Growth
84

Negative Growth
11

Total
95

71
9
35
199

23
0
8
42

94
9
43
241
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Table 6d: Pro-poor growth in Latin America
Country
Argentina

Measure
Ravalion and Chen

Poverty Equivalent
Growth rate
Chile

Ravalion and Chen

Poverty Equivalent
Growth rate
Paraguay

Ravalion and Chen

Poverty Equivalent
Growth rate
Uruguay

Ravalion and Chen

Poverty Equivalent
Growth rate

interval
1992-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
1992-2003
1992-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
1992-2003
1990-1994
1994-1998
1998-2000
1990-2000
1990-1994
1994-1998
1998-2000
1990-2000
1997-1999
1999-2001
2001-2002
1997-2002
1997-1999
1999-2001
2001-2002
1997-2002
1989-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
1989-2003
1989-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
1989-2003

Value
-7.1
-15.1
1.8
-8.0
-8.3
-17.3
-3.5
-8.6
8.8
2.5
-1.9
4.0
5.0
4.4
-1.2
4.1
-16.1
16.4
-30.0
-7.8

Pro-poor
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

-6.5
-4.8
5.9
-12.1
-3.7
-4.5
13.5
-14.5
-4.0

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Source: Gasparini (2005).
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Table 7: Cross Country Evidence of Pro-Poor Growth
Negative Growth Inequality Rises
Anti-Poor
Recession

Yrs

g

g20

Poland
Iran, Islamic
Rep
Slovak
Republic
Niger
Sierra
Leone

20

-0.2

-1.4

15

-0.4

-0.7

10

-0.4

-0.5

32

-0.6

21

Zambia

Broadly Shared
Growth

g

g20

32

Positive Growth/Inequality Rises
Not Propoor By
g g20
Yrs
Any
Definition
6.7
6.6 Costa Rica
35

1.6

-0.1

31

6.3

6.2

Tanzania

27

1.5

-2.1

Yrs

20

5.8

5.2

Bulgaria

10

1.5

-3.5

-1.3

Korea, Rep
Taiwan,
China
Hong Kong
China
Singapore

20

5.4

5.2

Panama

26

1.4

-2.3

-0.8

-7.7

China

15

5.0

1.6

Nigeria

38

1.2

-0.5

37

-1.0

-2.7

Malaysia

25

4.7

4.1

20

1.0

-0.2

Estonia

10

-1.7

-6.2

Thailand

36

4.2

3.1

30

0.7

-1.2

Latvia
Russian
Federation

10

-4.2

-7.4

Mauritius

11

3.7

1.6

Dominica
n Republic
El
Salvador
Senegal

31

0.2

-0.5

10

-5.6

-14.3

Brazil

33

2.5

0.3

Ethiopia

14

0.2

-1.2

Colombia
Mexico
Ecuador
Philippines
Chile
Peru

31
38
26
40
24
33

Negative Growth/Inequality Falls
Pro-Poor
g
g20
Yrs
Recession

2.3
2.1
2.1
0.9
1.7
0.3
1.5
0.5
1.4
1.1
0.4
0.1
Positive Growth/Inequality Falls

Pro-Poor
Biased Growth

Yrs

g

g20

Yrs

g

g20

Guyana

37

-0.4

-0.1

Gabon

15

7.7

9.0

Jordan

17

-0.6

1.0

Indonesia

35

3.7

4.4

Belarus

10

-1.8

-1.1

Tunisia

25

3.4

3.6

Madagascar

33

-2.1

-1.7

Trinidad &
Tobago
India
Banglades
h

31

1.8

2.1

34

1.8

2.2

32

1.3

1.5

Egypt, Arab
Rep
Ghana
Sri Lanka
Hungary

32

2.8

4.5

Nepal

18

1.2

3.9

10
32
31

2.4
2.3
2.2

4.3
3.4
2.7

35
28
22

1.1
0.5
0.3

1.5
1.3
1.0

Turkey

26

2.2

2.9

Jamaica
Honduras
Bolivia
Venezuela,
RB

31

0.1

0.1

Pakistan

32

2.2

2.8

Cord, Lopez, and Page (2003
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Figure 8: Schema for Analyzing Reform, Growth, Poverty and Inequality
Growth outcomes

Impact on Poor

Impact on Inequality

Reforms have no
impact on growth of
the economy. Growth
trajectory before and
after reform remains
the same
Poverty rate constant
Poverty rate decreases
Poverty rate increases

Reforms result in
recession. Growth
trajectory after reform
lower than before
reforms

Reforms result in
growth. The growth
trajectory after reforms
higher than before
reform

Poverty rate constant
Poverty rate decreases
Poverty rate increases

Poverty rate constant
Poverty rate decreases
Poverty rate increases

Inequality constant

Inequality constant

Inequality constant

Inequality decreases

Inequality decreases

Inequality decreases

Inequality increases

Inequality increases

Inequality increases
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Table 9: Growth in Latin America
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Table 11: Adjustment and Poverty in Africa
Country

Head count ratio Headcount
1985%
Ration 1999%

Change in
poverty(% points)

Cote d’Ivoire
Ghana
Kenya
Mauritania
Rwanda
Senegal
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

40.31
20.00
53.17
32.17
31.59
49.65
53.53
37.10
48.53
56.71

5.62
4.49
5.66
3.35
6.35
5.10
6.26
7.59
4.01
10.55

45.93
33.49
58.83
35.52
37.94
54.75
59.79
44.69
52.54
62.26

Change in
Macro policies
(score)
-1.3
2.2
0.5
0.5
-0.2
0.5
1.5
0.2
-0.3
1.0

Source: World bank 1994
Table 12: Evaluating Impact of Policy

Sector
Industrial
Small and micro enterprises
Commercial agriculture
Subsistence crop farming
Subsistence animal husbandry
Commercial fishing
Subsistence fishing

Population involved in
activity
5
10
5
55
15
5
5

Adjustment coefficient
15
6
20
2
1
10
0
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Appendix 1: African Growth: 1960-2003
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